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RECENT DECISIONS
BREACH OF WARRANTY - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - THIRTY
YEAR WARRANTY HELD PRESENT, NOT PROSPECTIVE. - Plaintiff,
a public utility company, purchased certain generators from the
defendant more than six years prior to the commencement of the
action. The complaint alleged implied warranties that the sets
"would be and would continue to be capable of continuous oper-
ation at full rated capacity for a full normal machine life of at
least 30 years." 1 It was further declared that the generators
ceased to be suitable and dependable after six and one-half years
of normal operation. The Supreme Court and the Appellate
Division ruled that the cause of action was barred by the six
year statute of limitations on breach of warranty.2 The Court
of Appeals, by a divided court, affirmed the decision of the lower
courts and held that a warranty that a machine will function
normally for thirty years is a warranty of present characteristics,
design and condition, and as such runs from the time of sale.
Citizens Util. Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409,
184 N.E.2d 171, 230 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1962).
Since the statute of limitations, by its terminology, begihis to
run as soon as the cause of action accrues,3 it is necessary to
determine precisely when the breach of warranty occurred. As
a general rule, an implied warranty is construed as a present
warranty, and the breach can only occur as of the date of sale
or delivery.4 Frequently, however, this rule works a hardship
on the plaintiff who finds his action barred before the breach is
discoverable or before his damages are determinable. Some courts
avoid this injustice by regarding the implied warranty as pros-
pective so that the cause of action does not accrue, and the statute
of limitations does not run until the time when the breach is
discovered,5 or should reasonably have been discovered.8 Other
courts achieve the same result by merely implying an exception
I Citizens Util. Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409, 416, 184
N.E.2d 171, 175, 230 N.Y.S.2d 194, 200 (1962).
2 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 48(1). This provision remains unchanged in
N.Y. Civ. PrAc. LAw & RuLES § 213(1), effective September 1, 1963.
3 Ibid.
4 Kakargo v. Grange Silo Co., 11 App. Div. 2d 796, 204 N.Y.S.2d 1010
(2d Dep't 1960) (memorandum decision) ; Allen v. Todd, 6 Lans. 222, 223-24
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872); cf. WILLISTON, SALES § 212a (rev. ed. 1948).
5 Woodworth v. Rice Bros. Co., 110 Misc. 158, 179 N.Y. Supp. 722 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd inee., 193 App. Div. 971, 184 N.Y. Supp. 958 (4th Dep't 1920),
aff'd nem., 233 N.Y. 577, 135 N.E. 925 (1922) (warranty implied "Elberta"
and "Willett" peach trees would bear such fruit).
6 Crawford v. Duncan, 61 Cal. App. 647, 215 Pac. 573 (1923); William-
son v. Heath, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 254, 108 S.W. 983 (1908); Ingalls v. An-
gell, 76 Wash. 692, 137 Pac. 309 (1913).
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to the applicable statute without considering whether the warranty
is present or prospective, 7
Although courts in the past have recognized the inequitable
hardships which can befall innocent parties in many instances by
limitations,8 the courts still find it difficult to qualify the general
rule as to when an action is barred.9  Such a qualification is
achieved by a court interpreting the warranty as prospective rather
than present. One of the early cases which applied such a
device was Kennard & Sons Carpet Co. v. Dornan.10 There the
court held that a warranty that a carpet would be free from
grease spots caused in manufacturing was broken when the spots
appeared, and not at the date of sale. Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack
Plumbing Co.," a recent California case, held that the implied
warranty on a radiant heating system was breached when the
defects were discoverable, not on the date of installation. In both
cases the court found a prospective warranty situation, reasoning
that otherwise there would be no meaning to the warranty in
question.
One of the earliest New York cases on this point, Allen v.
Todd,12 decided in 1872, set the pattern for some later decisions,
and reflects what according to the instant case is the settled New
York view.' 3 In the Allen case defendant represented that apple
trees he sold to plaintiff would bear a certain quality of fruit.
The issue was whether the statute of limitations ran from the
sale of the apple trees, or when the trees first bore apples. The
court discussed a prospective warranty situation, but decided that
the warranty here was of the present characteristics of the tree
and therefore the statute ran from the time of the sale.' 4 That
court did not reject the concept of prospective warranties, but
decided that absent express agreement between the parties, it
would not imply a prospective warranty from the elements of the
transaction.
7 P. H. Sheehy Co. v. Eastern Importing & Mfg. Co., 44 App. D.C. 107
(Ct. App. 1915); Tomita v. Johnson, 49 Idaho 643, 290 Pac. 395 (1930). The
court in the Sheehy case, supra, reasoned that by barring suits in cases where
the purchaser had no opportunity to discover the defect, the statute actually
promotes fraud, rather than preventing it.
8 See cases cited notes 5, 6 & 7 supra.
9 Kakargo v. Grange Silo Co., su pra note 4; Peterson v. Brown, 216
Ark. 709, 227 S.W.2d 142 (1950) ; Gaffney v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., 49
Del. 381, 117 A.2d 237 (Super. Ct. 1955).
1064 Mo. App. 17 (1895).
"155 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal. Rep. 257 (1961).
126 Lans. 222 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872).
13 Citizens Util. Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409, 416, 184
N.E.2d 171, 174, 230 N.Y.S.2d 194, 198 (1962).
14 Allen v. Todd, supra note 4, at 224.
[ VOL. 37
RECENT DECISIONS
An apparently contrary view was taken in Woodworth v.
Rice Bros. Co.,' 5 another fruit tree case, where the court seemed
to look more to the substance of the warranty than to the form.
In this determination, the majority interpreted the intention of
the parties to be that the guarantee "related entirely to the future,
and what the trees would do when the time of bearing arrived." 16
The Woodworth case was the last significant New York case in
this area until the present decision, whici was the first direct
appellate ruling on this point since Allen v. Todd.'7
In the present decision, the majority, recognizing the un-
fairness of requiring a purchaser to sue within six years on a
thirty year warranty, nevertheless held that the statute of limitations
was a bar to the action. The majority reasoned that "a warranty
express or implied that a machine is so built that it should last
30 years is a warranty of present characteristics, design and
condition and should not be stretched by implication into a
specific promise enforceable at the end of 30 years." 18 The majority
opinion justified any unfairness as the "same kind of 'unfairness'
that may result from almost any Statute of Limitations." 19 The
opinion does not reject or even mention prospective warranties.
In concluding, the majority intimated that perhaps plaintiff did
not even have a cause of action on implied warranty.20
The three dissenting judges considered the holding in the
instant case "unreasonable and unjust," and were of the opinion
that the position taken by the court would necessarily reduce all
such warranties to six years.2 ' In holding that the warranties
alleged in the complaint related to more than present conditions,
the dissent maintained that these warranties "are necessarily
prospective in nature, looking toward the future .... , 22 The
warranties, they continued, would not be breached until the gen-
erators failed to operate properly, and until that time the statute
of limitations would not begin to run.
Some jurisdictions have not recognized the need for qualify-
ing the general rule on limiting actions on warranties..2 3  Other
'
5 Supra note 5.
16 Id. at 161, 179 N.Y. Supp. at 724.
17 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sheila-Lynn, Inc., 185 Misc. 689, 695, 57 N.Y.S.
2d 707, 712 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (concurring opinion), affd inein., 270 App. Div.
835, 61 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1st Dep't 1946).Is Citizens Util. Co. v. American Locomotive Co., supra note 13, at 417,
184 N.E.2d at 174, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 198.19 Id. at 417, 184 N.E.2d at 175, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
20 Ibid.
21 Id. at 419, 184 N.E.2d at 176, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 200 (dissenting opinion).
22 Id. at 419, 184 N.E.2d at 176, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 201 (dissenting opinion).
23 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sheila-Lynn, Inc., supra note 17; E. 0. Painter
Fertilizer Co. v. Kil-Tone Co., 105 NJ.L. 109, 143 Atl. 332 (1928); Wood-
land Oil Co. v. A. M. Byers & Co., 223 Pa. 241, 72 Atl. 518 (1909).
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jurisdictions, however, have been more liberal in recognizing pros-
pective warranties.24  The general acceptance of some qualification
is reflected in the Uniform Commercial Code.2 r The Code adopts
the general rule of present warranties by saying "a breach of
warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made .... ,, 26 The
Code states further that "where a warranty explicitly extends to
future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must
await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues
when the breach is or should have been discovered." 27
Williston, quoted in both the majority and dissenting opinions
in the present case, also qualifies the general rule by saying that
"if the seller pro-mises that something shall happen or shall not
happen to the goods within a specified future time, the promise
. . .cannot be broken until that time has elapsed and until then
the statute will not begin to run." 28
The Citizens Utilities case leaves the question of whether a
warranty is present or prospective, unsettled in New York. How-
ever, as was noted by the dissent, if the courts in the future con-
tinue to find present warranties, as was done in the instant case,
they will, in effect, preclude breach of warranty actions which
arise six years after sale.
As far as the courts are concerned, the decision in Citizens
Utilities will not necessarily prevent future cases from being decided
differently. It is entirely possible that in another case the court
will apply the qualification or exception to the rule when the
facts require it. Qualifying the statutory period in judicial pro-
ceedings should be done on an ad hoc basis. Because the courts
sometimes have difficulty alleviating the hardships imposed by the
statute of limitations, this may be a fertile area for legislative
enactment. This was done in the analogous instance of an ex-
ception to the statute of limitations concerning frauds, where the
cause of action is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery
by the plaintiff of the fraud.2
9
24 Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12
Cal. Rep. 257 (1961); Southern Cal. Enterprises v. D. M. & E. Walter &
Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d 750, 178 P.2d 785 (1947); Cole v. Zellan, 55 A.2d 516
(D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1947), aff'd, 183 F.2d 139 (D.D.C. 1950); Heath v.
Moncrief Furnace Co., 200 N.C. 377, 156 S.E. 920 (1931); Cunningham v.
Frontier Lbr. Co., 245 S.W. 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Ingalls v. Angell,
76 Wash. 692, 137 Pac. 309 (1913).
25UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-725(2). The Code has been adopted
by the New York Legislature and will become effective September 27, 1964.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 212a (rev. ed. 1948).
29 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr. §48(5). This provision remains essentially un-
changed in N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW & RULES § 206(c), effective September 1,
1963.
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